Video presentations will be played during the first round of competition on February 19 during live Zoom sessions. There is no question and answer portion of the 3MT. Participants are encouraged but not required to join the Zoom session in which their presentation will be played. In the session, we'll also review how to create your video and share tips for a creating a successful 3MT presentation.
You do not need to attend more than one session. The content will be the same in all sessions. Register for a session to receive Zoom meeting information. February 10, pm - register. Note that the common theme among the judging criteria is the impact of the presentation on the audience.
Browse A-Z. Must be enrolled in a master's or doctoral program at Kansas State University in the Spring semester. The degree program need not formally require a thesis or dissertation. The presentation must address research the participant conducted during their graduate career at K-State not undergraduate research or graduate research conducted at another institution. Students are not required to have reached a particular point in their research, but those who are at least halfway through their program are likely to be more competitive.
Graduate students must receive approval from their major professor prior to registering for the competition. The first place winners from previous competitions are not eligible to compete this year; previous second place and people's choice award winners are eligible to participate in this year's competition.
Present a compelling oration of your original research topic and its significance using language appropriate for a non-specialist audience Presentations are to be spoken word e. Competitors exceeding 3 minutes are disqualified Prepare a single, static PowerPoint slide that represents the purpose and importance of your original research; no slide transitions, animations, or 'movement' of any type are allowed; the slide is to be presented from the beginning of the oration Props, sounds, and other materials may NOT be included in the presentation Presentations are considered to have commenced when a presenter starts their presentation through either movement or speech The decision of the judging panel is final.
Registration has closed for the competition Video Submission Students who have registered must submit their 3-minute video by February 17, , pm CST Guide to creating and submitting your video This year's competition will be held in a virtual format. Presentations will be evaluated on the following criteria: Comprehension and Content Did the presentation provide an understanding of the background and significance to the research question being addressed, while explaining terminology and avoiding jargon?
It's always challenging to articulate your research in a way that anyone, without your background, can understand, but it's such an important skill to have! The end goal for our research is to publish and share results with the community. I don't want my research to be limited to scientists in my field, but to be widely available and accessible, which is where science communication exercises like this come into play.
It is especially difficult to fit your research into three minutes, though. It's essentially an elevator pitch! Luckily, there is something we can do for the frogs. We can better manage the type of pesticide application by using tree injections in place of the more common soil drenching method, which not only has more effective uptake of imidacloprid by the hemlocks, but also has little to no runoff into nearby bodies of water. But it is a more expensive practice to consider in management decisions.
Dyck and collaborators are working with the Ohio Division of Wildlife to explore additional scenarios that will inform management decisions.
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You do not have access to any existing collections. You may create a new collection. Citation Request Accessible Version. Essays On Imperfect and Dynamic Competition. APA Watkins, W. Essays on Imperfect and Dynamic Competition. Chicago Watkins, William Edwin. Share on Facebook. Share on Twitter. The components of this work focus on both theoretical and empirical issues that arise in asymmetric oligopoly markets more generally. The first chapter considers that when consumers recycle a good, the future supply of intermediate inputs increases.
If some of the inputs are used to manufacture a good that competes with the original good, the initial seller faces an incentive to reduce its supply to limit this source of future competition. I illustrate this incentive in a model of dynamic oligopoly, and test the predictions using data from the US paper industry between and I find that firms decrease quantity in response to policy changes that increase competition from firms using the recycled input.
In our opinion, this is an overly artificial notion based on an excessively hypothetical analysis. Moreover, the European Commission has not validated the American approach. Given the importance of the relevant market in positive law, such an assessment is justified but will not be sufficient.
Indeed, the impossibility of grasping the characteristics of innovation at the relevant market definition stage may seriously limit the ability of competition law to address concerns related to innovation. Typology of innovative markets. This proposed typology, which draws on positive law, depends not only on the nature of the product in question, but also on the nature of the activity of the firm in question.
The law must then delineate several relevant markets. The first is the market for existing products. The second is the market for technologies. The third is the market for research and development, which will make it possible to identify — where the data allows — the market for future innovative products.
Ultimately, potential competition from other innovative firms will be better integrated into the analysis. Second, market power will be measured with an eye to the technologies being developed. This analysis could be performed in the pharmaceutical sector, for example. Given the time required for research and regulation, it would be possible to identify upstream the drugs that will be marketed in the near future.
The difficulty in assessing market power. Assessing market power poses new challenges. The first challenge lies in the lack of consensus in the economic literature regarding the actual harm produced by market power. The two historical theories, represented on either side by Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow, contradict each other in many respects. The broad-brush economic conclusions are as follows: for Schumpeter, the links between market power and innovation are positive, due to access to finance and the presence of a creative destruction process.
Here, market power is seen as a reward that stimulates innovation and should be subject to relatively lax oversight by the authorities. But these two theories can lead an overly rigid application of competition law, either too lax or too harsh. The same criticism does not apply to new industrial economics, which adopts a very measured approach to the bonds between competition and innovation through the inverted-U hypothesis.
But it is not exempt from criticism. Instead, the ideological opposition of economists has been superseded by an extreme complexity for the jurists tasked with applying competition law. To be sure, this merely reflects the complex reality to which the jurist must be able to adapt. But the assessment of market power in innovative markets must not be made impossible.
And here there are many questions, because the cross-cutting criteria that enable market power to be measured — market shares and turnover thresholds — are beset by several limitations where innovation is concerned. The insufficient criterion of market shares and market contestability. First, market shares can be highly volatile, so any fixed analysis can quickly become obsolete.
Second, the market power enjoyed by a firm can become non-contestable in innovative markets. In light of this, we suggest distinguishing two types of market power: super-dominance and hyper-dominance. Under a first scenario, a firm enjoys high market power in a market. It is then in a situation of super -dominance. Here, the addition of the prefix super refers to a quantitative superiority. Here one can speak of hyper- dominance, the prefix hyper describing a superiority that is both quantitative and across several markets or industries.
For example, Google, which is super -dominant in the online search market, also enjoys market power in online advertising and is expanding its economic influence to other sectors such as operating systems, web applications and robotics. In this case, it is also hyper -dominant. This proposal would allow analyses to factor in the contestability or non-contestability of a dominant position.
In doing so, it refers to the general theoretical framework of contestable markets. Market shares are then no longer the sole parameter of market power. The difficulties faced by current or potential competitors in penetrating the market must be added to the discussion.
Such difficulties can be a sign of market power. Conversely, market power may be less problematic, despite a high market share, in the case of low entry costs for a potential competitor. The assessment of market contestability must therefore take into account firms that are not yet present in the market in question, but which could enter this market in the medium term.
The insufficient criterion of turnover thresholds and transaction values. Turnover thresholds prove to be problematic when it comes the control of mergers. A merger is subject to approval in particular when the individual firms in question exceed a certain turnover threshold.
This turnover threshold places the acquisition of small innovative firms by firms with substantial market power outside the scope of competition law. However, such an acquisition may de facto exclude a potential competitor or prevent the deployment of innovations in the market. This study therefore proposes supplementing the analysis of turnover thresholds with thresholds based on transaction value.
This possibility, already permitted under North American law and German law, would make it possible to control mergers that could result in the exclusion of an innovative competitor. Title 2. The distinction between standards and rules. Beyond the conditions determining market power, in order to be sanctioned it must give rise to anticompetitive effects.
On this point, the singularity of innovation is once again evident. To understand restriction in the context of competition law, it has been proposed to go beyond the strict delineation according to types of practice.
The distinction between standards and rules is based more on the content of the rule and its normative specification. It makes it possible to address competition law with a relative unity. It is mainly according to their formulation that these standards are distinguished, and not according to the practice they target. First, there are broad standards of application, or what is referred to as the standard-based approach.
This subjective formulation of rules of conduct coexists with a more precise set of standards that form the economic approach to competition law or rule-based approach. For example, the concept of competition on the merits constitutes a standard.
The as-efficient competitor test, meanwhile, is a rule. In some cases, the standard also serves to support the formulation of a rule which may be deployed in an economic test. The choice between rule and standard can have consequences for the understanding of innovation. Standards, which are soft and malleable, also have a broad and subjective substance that can lead to uncertainty. Faced with these difficulties, these standards of application have gradually creeped towards a formal approach that is not suitable if the aim is to fully understand the behaviour of operators in innovative markets.
The example of competition on the merits, an ambiguous standard. In addition to the different standards for analysing the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law, that of competition on the merits is ambiguous. First, the very wording of the notion can refer directly to innovation. Competing on the merits also amounts to competing via innovation and intellectual property rights. The acquisition of an intellectual property right is the deserved reward for an innovative activity.
Second, the lack of a precise definition of this legal concept gives it a certain malleability, making it quite capable of receiving the issues related to innovative markets. For example, competition on the merits implies, first, recognition of the legality of powers of exclusion. Article TFEU does not prohibit a firm from acquiring market power on its own merits, and the recognition of the existence of such power does not in itself constitute a reproach of the firm in question.
Competition on the merits therefore corresponds to neither pure and perfect competition nor the protection of competitors, and it allows competition law to fully comprehend the Schumpeterian dimension of innovation: creative destruction. In some cases, however, this legal notion is more ambiguous than it seems.
While it makes it possible to go beyond a structural analysis of competition, its subjectivity may have led the European Commission to sanction practices according to overly formal criteria that do not allow all the specificities of innovative markets to be taken into account. For example, practices that tend to raise barriers in a market can be difficult to identify and are hard to distinguish from competitive behaviour that, while vigorous, does not fall within the scope of anticompetitive practice.
It is not certain that this classification is relevant for pay-for-delay agreements. The economic test approach and the complexity of innovation. On the other hand, however, when the effects-based approach is applied, economic tests prove to have shortcomings. Here, competition law is confronted not with its own rigidity, but with the complexity of the analysis of innovative markets.
Thus, anticompetitive conduct may be conditional on the demonstration of a profit-seeking strategy based on the exclusion of competitors. This would amount to sanctioning behaviours that result in a short-term loss of profit for the firm that implements them. A priori , there would therefore be no reason for a firm not to maximise its profits.
This is the case, for example, of investments in research and development for innovations that are likely to eventually be protected by an intellectual property right. The example of data-driven price discrimination. The price of the service offered to customers present on one side of the market is in fact charged to customers present on the other side of the market. One such notable example is online advertising. The firm provides a free service to an end-user but generates income in the advertising market that targets that user.
These cases have brought to light new forms of discrimination. The aim of Google — whose remuneration is based on the number of clicks — is to make sure that the most relevant advertisements those with higher click rates earn a higher placement in search results. Google has set up a specific system for this purpose in the AdWords platform.
It allows companies to place an advertisement that links to their own website when a user performs the corresponding search. The price of this place in the search results is determined by the combination of two factors: first, an auction system and, second, the quality score of the firm in question. But the amount that Google charges for ad links is calculated on the basis of an auction, in addition to whichGoogle carries out an adjustment to the placement based on the quality score that results directly from the relevance search algorithm PageRank.
Advertisers with lower quality scores are required to pay a higher price per click to gain higher positions than advertisers with higher quality scores. Because advertisers pay Google only if a user clicks on the advertisement displayed, Google always wins. The ambiguous effects of price discrimination. Data has therefore become a medium for price discrimination. On the one hand, it can lead some consumers to pay a higher price for a given good or service than they would have paid in the absence of discrimination.
Also, some observers consider that any situation in which a group of consumers unknowingly pays a different price for the same product is a clear sign of market failure that calls for intervention. On the other hand, however, other consumers enjoy more attractive prices. Digital data-based price discrimination can therefore improve total welfare— the sum of producer and consumer surpluses — by increasing the number of transactions. For example, the OECD reports that where price discrimination increases profits, it can also create an incentive for firms to engage in activities that will help them retain the ability to make those profits.
This may improve dynamic efficiency by encouraging competition in investment in innovation and by reducing costs. This possibility inevitably points to the need to take dynamic competition into account. In addition to price discrimination, the thesis also examines non-price discrimination, drawing on the case of Google Shopping, which, at the time of writing, had not yet been made public.
It was, however, able to highlight the exclusionary effect of the contentious behaviour and offered an analysis of it. The impossible defence based on innovation. But competition law remains, in some respects, too confined to a static approach to competition. The primary example of this is the impossibility of mounting a legal defence on the basis of dynamic efficiency gains.
From a theoretical viewpoint, it is certainly possible to invoke them. But their reception in legal disputes remains marginal. The degree to which they materialise in markets is subject to too much uncertainty, and the standard of proof is still too demanding to take into account gains whose very nature makes their existence probable but never certain.
However, there are potential avenues for action. The first is to offer firms the possibility of providing arguments and not proof , which would make it possible to insert dynamic efficiency gains more effectively within competition law. Conclusion of part one. Competition rules do not allow for the positive effects of certain innovative business models to be taken into account.
Also, innovation is an undeniably unique phenomenon for competition law. But the demonstration of such imperfections should not cast doubt on whether competition law should intervene in such innovate markets. For competition law to fully comprehend innovation, it must evolve. And because competition law is teleological, its objectives must also evolve.
The objective to promote innovation is insufficiently integrated into European law. It was necessary to assess the possibility of lifting innovation to the status of an objective of European competition law and to propose avenues for discussion to enable the law to operate in the context of innovative markets.
The reconciliation of competition law and innovation seems possible. Competition law can become a proactive tool by becoming part of innovation policy. But first, it was necessary to clearly distinguish the notions of competition policy, industrial policy and regulation. Here, economic analysis has long viewed competition law as a tool to neutralise public intervention in the economy.
As for the implementation of competition law, the study shows that from the perspective of industrial policy, it is not taken into consideration by the European Commission. Article TFEU and the strict interpretation of paragraph 3. As such, agreements meeting the conditions of Article 1 could be exempted on the basis of environmental effects,  safeguarding employment,  or preserving media pluralism.
It is therefore mainly in the guidelines on the assessment of Article 3 that elements of industrial policy are found. Indeed, the guidelines state that paragraph 3 applies to all agreements that meet the four conditions set out in paragraph 1. The same guidelines also require a quantification of the economic benefits — proof which seems very difficult to provide when the agreement is justified on industrial policy grounds.
It then seems impossible to exempt an anticompetitive agreement on the grounds that it would meet the objectives of an industrial policy. This is especially the case as we know that exceptions are interpreted strictly. Dominant firms may be regarded as national or European champions. In this sense, the Commission could display flexibility towards European firms in a dominant position on the basis of efficiency gains. Since , the main operators sanctioned have been the major operators in network industries, which are not far from corresponding to the notion of incumbent operators and therefore the notion of national or European champions.
The control of mergers and the dismissal of industrial policy concerns. The regulation on mergers contained no reference to industrial policy. However, its preamble did state that the Commission should place its appraisal within the general framework of achieving the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the economic and social cohesion of the community, referred to in Article A of the Treaty.
But the Court refused to place a normative value on the recitals in the preamble,  which confirmed the impossibility of marrying industrial policy with the application of merger control. Furthermore, the Council has refused to include the notion of public interest in the regulations. But the effects in terms of industrial policy have been scaled down.
The only possibility for an anticompetitive merger to be permitted relies on gains that produce pro-competitive effects, provided they are passed on to consumers, even though consumers are seldom targeted directly within the framework of innovation policy objectives. A desirable reconciliation. Yet the evolution of both competition law and industrial policies shows that a convergence of the two paradigms is both possible and necessary. The general theoretical framework of this study no longer assumes the existence of a blatant contradiction between these two forms of public intervention.
The renewal of innovation policies — the new avatar of industrial policy — has led to horizontal competitiveness policies, far from the image of a French-style Colbertist industrial policy. Indeed, the two paradigms are converging, mainly thanks to economic research on market failure. It can now be considered that competition policy and innovation policy are complementary in the effects that each produces. A more dynamic and less static notion of competition. Assigning an active innovation promotion role to European competition law would require the competition authorities to adopt in their analyses a longer-term and more dynamic view of competition.
This is necessary, because the simultaneous search for static and dynamic efficiencies can be conflicting. The reason is relatively intuitive: to support their costly innovation efforts — and therefore dynamic efficiency — firms need the prospect of significant profits and hope to achieve prices that are higher than the equilibrium price.
Supporting innovation efforts may therefore amount to supporting supra -competitive pricing. Ex ante and ex post competition. Dynamic competition must factor in the entire innovation process, including ex ante and ex post competition. The feedback loops of the innovation process lead to a constant back-and-forth between pre-innovation competition and post-innovation competition. Herein lies a paradox: increased competition ex post may reduce incentives ex ante.
Schematically, increased competition after the commercialisation of an innovation — made possible by its diffusion — can prevent firms from commencing their own innovative activities. For example, one of the functions of intellectual property rights is to reduce competition ex post in order to create ex ante incentives for firms to invest in innovative projects.
In order to incorporate these two timeframes into the analysis, competition law must adopt a dynamic approach to competition. On this topic, a study of state aid rules has been undertaken. The promotion of innovation is indeed stated as an objective, and the exemption allows for a subtle incentive game centred on innovation-specific market failure. A limitation has nevertheless been identified. The legislation defines three categories of aid: fundamental research, industrial research and experimental research.
The different stages of research are complementary and interdependent. Because in order for innovations to enter the market and be disseminated via the economic channel, investment in experimental and industrial research must be equivalent. Consumer welfare must also be redefined. The European Commission analyses the effects of a practice on a market in the light of this criterion. A practice is anticompetitive when it drives up prices and therefore prejudices the consumer.
However, such a criterion is imperfect because it is based on an overly static notion of competition. But this criterion is vague and overly controversial. The Court of Justice having explicitly ruled it out, a more conciliatory criterion had to be found. It is more in keeping with stimulating innovation, because it incorporates factors other than mere price competition.
It factors into the analysis the degree of freedom available to consumers to approach one or more suppliers or partners other than the firm in question. It offers a way around static competition. The fact remains that competition law must still be able to implement this new objective of stimulating innovation.
This approach arises, sparsely, when it is confronted with very specific issues. For example, competition law seems to offer a balanced response to interoperability requirements in innovative markets and to standard-setting agreements and technology pooling agreements, which lead to the shared use of technologies.
Regarding interoperability, competition law has taken stock of this imperative. The notorious Microsoft case is one example among others. The circumstantial application of the doctrine of essential facilities for interoperability seems appropriate. In this case, competition law adapts to certain imperatives of the innovation economy, such as the network economy and cumulative innovation.
We believe this possibility is consistent if competition law intends to play an active role within the framework of dynamic competition. In such a case, the violation of intellectual property rights and of the incentive to innovate — which raises the majority of objections — is measured.
Innovative markets, for instance, face the phenomenon of technology fragmentation. For example, a smartphone consists of a mobile system, comprising the materials case, screen , operating hardware card, semiconductors , operating software, application software slide-to-unlock technology, the ability to view emails without submitting a server request, autocomplete typing when drafting text messages and the gamut of features not directly visible to the user , a network and standards.
These system goods require the combination of a very broad range of technologies, protected by intellectual property rights whose owners are often different — and possibly competing — firms and may even belong to several different industries. To meet this challenge, economic operators have set up innovation commons, sometimes at the behest of the authorities, the most traditional of which — standard-setting agreements and technology pooling agreements — are subject to specific treatment under competition law.
Competition law has been able to welcome this type of agreement and a detailed analysis of the existing rules shows that the balance between the incentive to innovate and the diffusion of innovation, in the context of standard-setting, is ensured. But limitations reappear when economic operators take advantage of the standard-setting process. First, patent holders assert their intellectual property rights by asking judges to grant injunctions to prevent the sale of competing products even though they had agreed to a FRAND commitment.
After the Motorola and Samsung cases, the Huawei case clarified the conditions for such abuse of a dominant position. In this case, the Court of Justice achieved a good balance between the incentive to innovate and the diffusion of innovation by granting innovative companies a sphere of competitive immunity.
Exploitation of standard-setting and patent ambush.
When there is competition, they make products cheaper, so they can lower their prices further. Under Free-Market, competition is an economic process where men to raise their self up and not to compete to put down others but raising their competitors up in the process and charting value which are unlimited.
The key concern of the Free-market competitor and producer is the creative works and as a close second, its profitability and commercial application. The productive and creative conglomerates in a free market economy create competitive prices and permitting buyers from all social strata to afford the new and improved.
The key to the success of a Free-market competition is the limitation of competition to the economic sphere of production. It has been proven that without competition a firm can control a society by selling a product everyone needs and inflate prices to make more turnovers.
Competition will thus decrease inferior products at inflated prices because you can just buy from the firm that gives you the best deal. Indirectly, the competition in Free-Market society will lead to competencies. That is the most significant value of creating skills. Important areas of knowledge are unique to a free-market economy and critical to the country's long term growth and innovation.
Free Market involves an important degree of coordination and cooperation among suppliers, producers and customers. Since the drive in the Free-Market economy is focused on profits and Cost, there could be a creation of monopoly in areas that are deemed unimportant. Substantial economic fortunes are being accumulated into the hands of a few tycoons sitting atop huge empires, and the new free market firms have rapidly gravitated to monopoly status. In brief, monopoly power is ascendant as never before.
The monopoly power that free-market firms have can direct to lower levels of output and higher prices and a loss in welfare. A monopolist increase price and slashes output. Producer surplus increases, consumer surplus decreases, and community surplus decreases welfare loss. Firms seek to achieve monopolies, sole control of services and goods, where prices are set by the firm rather than market demands. In a free market economy, it creates a huge gap in between the rich and the poor.
In order to make money, firstly you have to take it from other people. This can be done through buying and selling goods, taxation or any other means. Rich become richer due to the law inheritance and economic autonomy to own property economic development. The poor go on becoming poorer. Vast imbalances in opportunity encourage uprising, because some individuals focus all the wealth in their control.
Wealth is accumulated in certain hands. People tend to get caught up in hypo theoretical bubbles but ignore economic essentials, leading to absurd behavior. Unethical, fraudulent and exploitation of laborers are often noticed in such an economy. Wages are intentionally set very low as laborers will endure.
Steps to guarantee consumer protections such as quality and safety are in use when they can draw a customer base. The conflict between the workers and free market enthusiast goes on. Therefore, free market society not only fails to provide fairness of opportunity, but also fails to create equality of outcome. Monopoly leads to inequality and can contribute to economic stagnation, everything else being unequal. This can be justified by how The United States and most of the European Union economy trapped in an economic stagnation and crisis since the Looking at employment statistics in Britain today after the Great Recession of , unemployment in Britain stands at roughly two million.
This is not too far from the three million mark of the Margaret Thatcher era. With the private sector fallout and public sector job losses, expected to claim another million people, it is unsurprising that people fear a return to those dark days.
State Industries that are deemed vital but not necessasary viable may be closed down or reconstructed. The late Margaret Thatcher closed down mining industry, fishery industry, coal industry and focused on financial industry. This lead to drastic increase in employment rate. This comes with a cost such as cost cutting drives, technology and innovation replacing workers, foreign trade and outsourcing, constantly finding cheaper labors leads to unemployment.
Whether long-term unemployment is lasting or temporary, the current unemployment data and figures remains far from being resolved. It is an organic feature of the Free-market system in action. The continual drive for efficiency in production and profit is the spirit of the Free-Market Economic setup, regardless of the cost to thousands of entirely capable workers.
The only solution is an essential change in the way the society is structured. Small business schools rarely have separate endowments and are challenged with scarce resources. Therefore, enrollment is important for small business schools to survive in an increasingly competitive higher education market.
This dissertation asks the following questions: 1 what is the nature of their planning processes used in the formation of business school strategy and mission; 2 how, if at all, do case study business schools analyze their competitive position in regard to other business schools in their strategy and mission; 3 with decreases in student demand, how are unranked accredited business schools using competitive advantage to find new areas for student growth; 4 in an attempt to gain competitive advantage, have institutions modified their mission or their strategic plan in reaction to external market forces, if so, in what ways do they develop their strategies and competitive advantages?
To answer these questions three small business schools were chosen in the upstate region. Due to the sensitivity of the topic all three institutions were granted anonymity. All three schools are challenged with enrollment declines as well as increasing competition from ranked and for-profit schools in their respective location. The research is qualitative with interviews of presidents, provosts, senior administrators and senior faculty. Interviews are coded using key areas such as competition, markets, marketing, strategy, and curriculum.
Strategic plans, mission statements, and historical documents were reviewed. The research shows that even though small schools are aware of their competitors, they do not sufficiently take them into account in seeking to establish competitive advantage. They thus make themselves even more vulnerable to market forces.
Richardson, Theodore R.
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